STONE.DOC

9/17/2019 4:03 PM

Labor and Finance as Inevitably
Transnational: Globalization
Demands a Sophisticated
and Transnational Lens

TIMOTHY A. CANOVA*
CLAIRE MOORE DICKERSON**
KATHERINE V.W. STONE***

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 109
INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND TRADE .................................................................. 110
A. Trade as a Threat to Labor Rights ........................................................... 111
B. Two Current Debates ............................................................................... 111
1. Labor Rights Versus Labor Standards .............................................. 113
2. Transnational Regulation or Legal Pluralism? ................................ 114
3. New Approaches ............................................................................... 115
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW AND POLICY.................................................. 117
APPLIED INTERNATIONAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONCEPTS ............................... 119

* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. Author of Part III.
** Professor of Law and Arthur L. Dickson Scholar, Rutgers Law School,
Newark. Author of Parts I & IV.
*** Professor of Law, Cornell Law School and Anne Evans Estabrook Professor of
Dispute Resolution, Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations. Author of Part II.

109

STONE.DOC

9/17/2019 4:03 PM

I. INTRODUCTION
To train lawyers to operate effectively in a world of vanishing borders,
law schools must include international realities into their domestic law
courses. To effect a seamless weave of international and domestic
considerations, the perspective must be as broad and inclusive as possible;
socioeconomics offers that point of view by inviting the use of richly
varied threads.
For years, certain scholars have insisted that law professors should
integrate international and domestic law in their teaching. For years, we
law professors have resisted, presumably in part because it is daunting to
have to learn not only the relevant domestic field, but also the
international counterpart—whatever that is.1 However, as we prepare
lawyers who will work into the middle of the twenty-first century, we no
longer have a choice. The world in which our students will practice
is complex and will only become more so. Issues of cultural diversity
unimagined in the first half of the last century entered legal discourse
through critical race theory, and are now exploding into our consciousness
through the effects of globalization. We need a template that can
encompass not only our narrow, domestic experience, but also the
experience of those to whom globalization introduces us.
The dominant paradigm in the legal academy over the past few
decades has been law and economics.2 Some of the challenges to this
school discuss its dependence on a narrow conception of efficiency. For
example, perhaps efficiency can mean more than profit maximization;
perhaps it can even include distributional effects by espousing an
underlying egalitarian value.3 That would be a first step, but we need a
more radical reshaping of our analytic tools if we are to take into
1. See, e.g., John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in U.S. Law
Schools: Plenty of Offerings, But Too Few Students, 31 INT’L LAW. 845, 856–57 (1997)
(recommending the integration of international law in domestic courses); Harold Hongju
Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 305, 308 (2001) (observing that
as the twentieth century witnessed the move in American law schools from teaching
private to public law, the twenty-first century will focus on teaching transnational public
law subjects; the issue for the American law schools is how to integrate international and
domestic law teaching).
2. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 916 (1992); David Millon, New
Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of
Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency
Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1006 n.3, 1069–70 (2001) (asserting that equity,
the “equality of economic well-being,” is critical to the definition of efficiency); see also
Richard S. Markovits, Duncan’s Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination
of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1169, 1176–77, 1194 (1984) (noting that either
utilitarianism or egalitarianism can be values underlying an economic efficiency analysis).
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appropriate account the many differences within our globalized arena.4
Socioeconomics, a multidisciplinary perspective that welcomes not only
economics and psychology, but also anthropology and sociology, can
help us broaden our perspective.5
Two legal fields that have acutely felt the pressures of globalization
are labor and finance law. Parts II and III describe how both of these
areas affect and are affected by globalization. These Parts also discuss the
contribution of socioeconomics to our understanding of both the impacts
of globalization on labor and finance, and potential responses to those
impacts. In Part IV, we discuss the importance of consciously and explicitly
both recognizing the consequences of globalization, and integrating
socioeconomic concepts into our teaching of these areas of the law.
II. INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND TRADE
A.

Trade as a Threat to Labor Rights

Globalization refers to the exponential increase in cross-border
economic transactions that has occurred over the past twenty-five years.
It is the result of a confluence of factors, including trade liberalization by
governments, increased foreign direct investment by firms, and changes
in transportation and communication technologies that have made it
possible for corporations to carry on many aspects of production from
anywhere in the world.6 Globalization offers many advantages to
consumers and producers around the world, but it is not always
beneficial for workers. With the increase in global trade and direct
foreign investment over the past twenty-five years, the production and
4. An appreciation of cultural differences is at the heart of much legal scholarship
today. For two profoundly dissimilar conceptions of cultural differences that nevertheless
share a conviction that these differences are important, see generally Douglas Lee
Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a
Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
391 (2001) (discussing conflicts between universal human rights and both national
sovereignty and cultural diversity, and suggesting how to avoid the traditional dispute
between relativists and universalists through a pragmatic approach based on incremental
assertion of jurisdiction by international institutions); Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent,
54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001) (asserting that to avoid silencing dissent, law as a normative
matter should recognize and protect the diversity within identifiable cultures, both in the
United States and abroad).
5. LYNNE DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH ch. 1
(forthcoming 2004).
6. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, To the Yukon and Beyond: Local
Laborers in a Global Labor Market, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 93, 94–95 (1999).
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distribution of goods and services no longer stops at the national border.
In addition to an increase in bilateral trade, regional trading blocs and
transnational trade regulatory bodies such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO)7 have proliferated, and trade barriers of all types have decreased.
In this environment of increasingly internationalized production, there
is a serious danger that hard-won domestic labor standards and labor
rights will be eroded. Free capital mobility and free movement of goods
put U.S. workers in competition with low-wage workers around the
world. Further, when workers attempt to improve labor standards, they
are often confronted with a threat of business relocation to countries
with fewer labor protections.8 The prospect of capital flight—sometimes
called “location blackmail”—creates two types of problems for labor.
The first problem, known as the race to the bottom, is that firms with
significant labor costs will tend to move to lower-cost environments for
the labor-intensive aspects of their operations. One consequence is that
labor at the bargaining table cannot be aggressive in its demands lest it
induce employers to move.
The second problem is regulatory
competition between states. When firms make credible threats of
relocating, it becomes difficult for labor to gain support for legislation
granting higher labor standards. Legislators are fearful that they will be
blamed if firms in their districts subsequently relocate. Plant closings
are poison for political careers. Thus countries have a tendency to lower
their worker protective regulations in order to attract or keep business.
Given the damaging potential of unrestricted global trade on labor
standards, there is an intense debate about whether, and in what way,
trade liberalization should be accompanied by efforts to strengthen labor
rights and improve labor standards.9 On one side, labor and its
supporters in the developed countries (DCs or the North) seek to protect
hard-won labor rights by imposing requirements that trade expansion be
accompanied by fair labor standards. On the other side, free market
advocates oppose any intervention or regulation of the global market.
Also, on the other side, some groups in the less developed countries
(LDCs or the South) argue that transnational mandatory labor standards
are a form of protectionism—that by imposing the high labor standards
that currently exist in the developing world, the nations of the developed
world prevent jobs from moving to the LDCs. Further, they argue,
7. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
8. Stone, supra note 6, at 97–98 (citing studies).
9. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions in U.S. Trade Law:
“Aggressive Unilateralism”?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 71, 71–71, 83–89 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
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mandatory labor standards do not level the playing field, but rather
deprive the low-wage countries of their distinct, and often only,
comparative advantage.
The issue of protectionism is more complicated than a simple NorthSouth standoff, and it has become apparent that races to the bottom are
not simply a North-South problem. Jobs moved from Argentina to
Brazil when Brazil changed its tax structure. Jobs are moving from
Brazil to Indonesia in pursuit of lower wages. Soon, many jobs will
move to China. As races to the bottom become problems for workers in
the LDCs, it is becoming evident that a drive for minimal labor
standards is not simply labor protectionism by the DCs, but a necessity
of workers in both spheres for mutual survival. The spread of globalized
production under current rules of trade and institutional arrangements is
accompanied by, if not generating, a widening income gap between rich
and poor in all countries. Therefore, unions in the DCs increasingly
favor some sort of transnational protection for labor rights.
Socioeconomics provides a multifaceted understanding of the threat to
labor standards posed by increased trade, portraying the threat not as an
inevitability, but as a policy choice. It looks at the cultural and social
factors that affect social problems in order to suggest solutions to
problems that are often presented as incurable. For example, the
socioeconomic approach teaches us to separate the concept of
“globalization” from the concept of “free trade.” Globalization refers to
increased trade, investment, and production across national borders.
Over the past several decades, changes in communication and
transportation technologies, together with falling tariffs and other trade
barriers, have led to more cross-border transactions between private
actors. But this increasing globalization of economic life is not the same
as “free trade.” Free trade is a normative ideal of frictionless markets
unfettered by government regulation. Such a regime has never existed,
and does not now exist. The issue is not, then, free trade or labor
standards—it is what kind of trade regime is most conducive of decent,
fair, and equitable labor conditions around the world.
B. Two Current Debates
At present, there are (at least) two important issues of disagreement
among supporters of global labor standards. First, there is the debate
between labor standards and labor rights. Second, there is disagreement
between those who advocate that global labor standards be established
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and policed by private sector actors, such as progressive pressure groups,
consumers, labor unions, and even firms committed to best practices,
and those who advocate that global standards be established and policed
by transnational governmental-like regulatory agencies with enforcement
powers. The former position has been called the legal pluralism approach,10
or the Lilliput strategy.11 The latter position is the transnational governance
approach, which focuses on securing labor provisions in trade treaties
and a social clause in the WTO.12
1. Labor Rights Versus Labor Standards
In 1998, the International Labor Organization (ILO) issued a Declaration
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work that declared that four
labor rights are “fundamental” or “core”: (1) the freedom of association,
including the recognition of the right to collective bargaining, (2) the
elimination of forced labor, (3) the abolition of child labor, and (4) the
elimination of employment discrimination.13 However, the universal
expressions of core labor rights are inherently ambiguous, rendering
them difficult to monitor or enforce. Every specific definition of a
right—a right to organize, to strike, and so forth—expresses a particular
normative vision of the appropriate power relationship between labor
and capital. When labor activists use the rhetoric of the right in the
general form, they are advocating a particular vision of what the right
should mean. While there is nothing wrong with attempting to present
one’s particular notion of the content of a right in the abstract form,
when it is done by advocating labor standards appropriate to the
developed world, it is likely to encounter resistance from developing
countries. Stated differently, an approach that relies on the four
fundamental labor rights may achieve consensus at a high level of
abstraction, but if one tries to further particularize and define these
rights, the consensus evaporates.
For these reasons, it seems necessary, and more straightforward, to
develop an agenda that includes substantive minimal global labor
standards. If global labor standards are established not as mathematically
10. See, e.g., H.W. Arthurs, Globalization of the Mind, 12 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 219,
219–221 (1997).
11. JEREMY BRECHER ET AL., GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: THE POWER OF SOLIDARITY
26–29 (2000).
12. See Virginia A. Leary, “Form Follows Function”: Formulations of International
Labor Standards—Treaties, Codes, Soft Law, Trade Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS 179, 189–203 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003).
13. INT’L LABOUR ORG., DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS
AT WORK (1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/decl/declaration/
text/index.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
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precise terms but as general benchmarks based on local conditions, it
might be possible to arrive at some deeper consensus about what kinds
of minimal living wages should be paid, what kinds of safe working
conditions are necessary in a humane society, and so forth. For example, in
the area of occupational health and safety it should be possible to
identify certain minimal safety standards and exposure levels that can be
enforced through some kind of international channels. Similarly, it
should be possible to define a socially appropriate minimum wage, such
as a wage sufficient to feed, house, clothe, and educate oneself and one’s
family, under existing national economic conditions. These locally tailored
benchmarks could then become the minimum standard that a transnational
trade organization would enforce. The local benchmark approach advocated
here is similar to the concept of the poverty line that was developed in
the United States in the 1960s. Such an approach, with its focus in
social and cultural as well as economic aspects of human existence and
interaction, proposes specific labor standards rather than abstract labor
rights. Yet they are locally appropriate standards rather than Western
standards set to deprive workers in DCs of jobs.
2. Transnational Regulation or Legal Pluralism?
The second issue of current debate concerns who should determine
and enforce global labor standards. Should labor standards be established
through regulatory bodies, or should they emerge from within civil
society?14 There have been a number of attempts by regulatory bodies to
determine transnational labor standards on a regional scale in recent
years. The European Union has used methods of direct regulation and
indirect harmonization to achieve convergence in labor standards among
member nations. Another method of regulation to affect transnational
labor standards is found in the Labor Side agreement to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAALC), in which a party can bring a
complaint against a nation for not enforcing its own labor laws.15 These
transnational regulatory mechanisms for raising and policing labor
standards apply within a specific trading bloc and are embedded within
the fabric of treaties that constitutes the rules of the trading bloc more
14. See, e.g., David M. Trubeck et al., Transnationalism in the Regulation of
Labor Relations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks, 25 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 1187, 1188–89 (2000).
15. See Stone, supra note 6, at 111–12.
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generally. Before any of these regulatory mechanisms could be applied
globally, there would have to be an international institutional framework
governing trade to which they would be attached. Currently, the WTO is
the most important global body for regulating trade, but proposals for
inserting a social clause in the WTO have been highly controversial and,
to date, flatly rejected. The WTO has rebuffed all efforts to address labor
standards, taking the position that labor standards are the terrain of the
ILO.16
In addition to the public regulatory approaches, there are many
proposals for mechanisms to raise labor standards through actions by
private actors within civil society.17 These proposals, in different ways,
embody strategies that have been called the “Lilliput strategy” of using
small, decentralized actions to tame the global giant. All of them are
potentially effective, but they all have limits as well. For example, the
ILO’s approach of articulating fundamental labor rights and seeking
voluntary adherence by means of scrutiny and publicity for countries
that do not comply has met with some success, but it is clear that
transparency alone does not always change corporate behavior.
Similarly, campaigns by the National Labor Committee and other
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that use publicity to shame
corporations with extremely low labor standards have succeeded in
bringing about change, but only when they were brought against
corporations that produce consumer products that have identifiable
name brands. In contrast, it is almost impossible to mount a consumer
boycott against a company that produces intermediate goods, such as the
dials and gears used inside oil refineries. Also, while NGOs have, at
times, succeeded in inducing companies to adopt codes of conduct for
their labor conditions, the codes require monitoring. Achieving
monitoring and compliance with codes has, to date, proven to be
extremely difficult.
Finally, multinational union pressure can be an effective mechanism
to raise labor standards, at least where strong unions in more than one
country share a common employer. Unions in different countries with a
common employer could coordinate contract bargaining goals or
contract expiration dates with their counterparts overseas. This is an
approach to global labor standards that we can expect to see utilized
more frequently in the future, but it would only help employees of
multinational firms that had strong unions in several countries. It would
16. Id. at 105–08.
17. See Arthurs, supra note 10, at 226–43; Michael Posner & Justine Nolan, Can
Codes of Conduct Play a Role in Promoting Workers’ Rights?, in INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 12, at 207, 207–26; Trubeck et al., supra note 14, at
1188–92.
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not bring about a harmonization of labor conditions more generally.
Thus, the Lilliput strategy is a series of partial, albeit sometimes
effective, techniques to change corporate conduct. Because neither
regulatory nor legal pluralist approaches alone can maintain global labor
standards, it is necessary to find an approach that bridges the divide
between regulation and legal pluralism, between hard law and soft law.
3. New Approaches
Socioeconomics insists that private actors and public regulation are
inevitably intertwined. Private actor initiatives are the engines that fuel
regulatory change, and at the same time, governmental regulations create
the field of possibilities upon which private pressures can operate.
Therefore, in the area of labor and trade, it is necessary to devise
regulatory initiatives that are designed to enable local activists to be
effective.
One example of a new approach to labor standards is to link labor
rights to intellectual property rights.18 In global production, multinational
corporations (MNCs) produce using subcontractors all over the world.
One of the primary sources of value for producers of consumer
commodities lies in the trademark that identifies the product with the
multinational firm. The tool of trademark protection enables large retailers
and brand-named merchandisers to establish networks of subcontractors
who produce their products in the LDCs. For Nike, Banana Republic,
Home Depot, and the like, production is diffuse and decentralized, and
yet their products command high prices in the market due to the value of
their brand name and trademark. Typically, the brand-name business
does not own the overseas facility, hire the labor, or supply the raw
materials. Rather, the MNCs design the product and then subdivide the
production tasks and subcontract each task to firms in the LDCs. The
subcontractors often further subcontract to thousands of nameless
invisible suppliers. After the composite parts have been assembled, often
by another specialty subcontractor, the MNC affixes its brand name to the
product and then markets the product to consumers. While all the
constituent suppliers are paid all along the commodity chain, the lion’s
share of the profit accrues to the MNC.
Commodity chain production gives MNCs high profits as a result of
the difference between the high consumer price for the finished good
18.

Stone, supra note 6, at 129.

117

STONE.DOC

9/17/2019 4:03 PM

and low costs of production. To reap these profits, the MNCs provide
product design, organizational acumen, legal knowledge, and a recognizable
trademark. Of these MNC inputs, the trademark is probably the most
important source of value. Without trademark protection, other manufacturers
could enter the field, copy the product, hire their own subcontractors,
and compete away the supra-profits. For example, entire empires have
been built upon the Nike swoosh and the image of Mickey Mouse,
empires that would quickly collapse without trademark protection.
The MNCs are able to profit from global production arrangements
because they can affix a trademark to the product, no matter who
produced the good or under what conditions. Yet trademarks are
protected by the international trading system. Given the dependency of
MNCs on the international trading system for protection of their
trademarks, we should consider conditioning MNCs’ entitlement to
trademark protection to the labor standards under which the goods are
produced. That is, we might treat the issue of international regulation of
labor standards as an aspect of international protection for intellectual
property. For example, we might permit parties to challenge a firm’s
entitlement to trademark on the basis of the poor labor standards the firm
maintains. Or, we might require a party seeking to gain intellectual
property rights to demonstrate that it meets some minimum level of
labor standards in its facilities. While labor issues may seem irrelevant
to intellectual property concerns, property is “bundle of rights,” and it is
legitimate for social policy to determine what sticks are included in the
bundle.
To grant intellectual property protection in today’s world is to give the
grantee a ticket to produce in the global marketplace. It would not be
unreasonable for the state to condition that protection with an obligation
to produce under fair conditions in the global labor market. If a
trademark signified that a good had been produced under internationally
acceptable labor conditions, then consumers could select their goods by
seeking those with trademarks. Alternatively, a trademark authority
could vary the mark to indicate the degree of compliance, thereby
permitting consumers to identify and target those goods produced under
substandard conditions. This approach would also enable workers to
challenge their labor conditions by contesting the firms’ trademark
protection for the good so produced. It would give workers and their
unions great leverage to bring about change.
This proposal is one example of regulatory change that would
empower private actors to bring effective pressure on corporate conduct.
However, to achieve trademark conditionality would require a major
reorientation in the international intellectual property regime. To bring
about such a change will require sustained and coordinated pressure by
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labor groups. The American labor movement learned a century ago that
without the clout to take wages out of competition, firms would tend to
downgrade rather than upgrade their labor conditions. Labor groups around
the world will need to exercise their clout if they want to reform the
current shape of global institutions and ensure that globalization means a
leveling up rather than a leveling down of working peoples’ living
standards. Globalization, like a rising tide, can raise all boats or swamp the
little ones and sink them to the bottom. It is the role of socioeconomics and
law to give social actors the vision and tools they need to stem the tide.
III. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW AND POLICY
The field of law and socioeconomics offers a compelling pedagogic
vehicle for breathing contemporary relevance into the law school curriculum.
This is particularly so in teaching about virtually any aspect of globalization,
and certainly international monetary law, a course that stands on its own
or as part of other courses in the business law curriculum.19 While
international monetary law is admittedly a rather specialized area, its
presentation through a socioeconomic lens provides ample opportunities
for important insights into the contradictions and failings of the dominant
law and economics paradigm.
By drawing on a variety of core disciplines, socioeconomics provides
an eclectic critique of the orthodox economic paradigm and a far better
understanding of economic behavior and market failure than does the
simple law and economics “rational person” approach.20 Socioeconomics’
interdisciplinary approach can also offer compelling reform proposals
and alternative paradigms to replace the failing orthodox model.21
Socioeconomics dissects the assumptions of the orthodox paradigm.
For neoclassical economics, the legitimizing assumption in international
trade theory is David Ricardo’s “law of comparative advantage,” a
justification for free trade policies that seeks to explain how trade should
maximize each nation’s output.22 According to Ricardian theory, each
19. For instance, international monetary law should increasingly be seen as a
necessary component of any course in international trade law or international business
transactions.
20. Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 611, 612.
21. Socioeconomics draws upon such core disciplines as history, psychology,
political science, anthropology, economics, and sociology. Id.
22. Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of
Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political
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country should produce those goods for which it has a comparative
advantage, and then trade such goods for others produced more efficiently
elsewhere.23 In this way, labor specialization and trade liberalization are
supposed to allow each nation to maximize its output and aggregate
income.24
Socioeconomics dissects the Ricardian model from a variety of vantage
points. It argues that even if a comparative advantage results in increasing
output, the gains in output and income are aggregate gains. However,
when disaggregated, trade liberalization necessarily results in winners
and losers within each country, thereby creating new and exacerbating
existing political and social tensions.25 From a utilitarian perspective,
losers should be compensated and retrained from declining to rising
industries, an approach that requires the same kind of interventionist
government policies that are often criticized by law and economics as
antimarket.26 As a practical matter, without such redistributionist and
industrial policies, the costs of trade liberalization are not shared
equitably, and as a result, there is often fierce political opposition to
trade liberalization.
In addition to inequities within individual countries, trade rarely balances
out between countries in the real world. In a regime of freely floating
Economy, 69 UMKC L. REV. 733, 751, 755 (2001) (arguing that in international trade
law “legitimacy seems to derive from the tacit agreement, underlying virtually all, if not
all, of the WTO and GATT rules, that the law of comparative advantage is valid”).
23. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
132–34 (3d ed. 1821), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID
RICARDO 1, 132–34 (Piero Sraffa ed., 1953).
24. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
801 (7th ed. 1998).
25. The great British economist John Maynard Keynes, an opponent of the laissez
faire do-nothing policy of his day (and therefore one of the grandparents of socioeconomics),
once wrote: “In the long run we are all dead.” JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, MONETARY
REFORM 88 (1924). Today, we should entertain a corollary to Keynes’s dictum: “In the
aggregate we are alright. But in the disaggregate, many of us are not.” While the
orthodox free-market model may restore a country’s trade balance (in the aggregate) and
may permit a resumption of income and economic growth (in the aggregate), the
distribution of the growth is by necessity, if not design, a top-heavy one in which the
elites reap the lion’s share of the pie.
26. For instance, the Reagan administration displayed such a law and economics
animus for retraining workers displaced by foreign imports when it reduced federal
spending on trade adjustment assistance. Timothy A. Canova, Monologue or Dialogue
in Management Decisions: A Comparison of Mandatory Bargaining Duties in the United
States and Sweden, 12 COMP. LAB. L.J. 257, 263 (1991); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN &
ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT (1980) (arguing against
public education as contrary to market preferences and in favor of the privatization of
education through vouchers); Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A
Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 255, 269–74 (1991) (arguing against trade adjustment assistance for displaced
workers).
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exchange rates, fluctuations in currency values provide the adjustment
mechanism to bring trade and payments back into balance. A country
with a trade and current account deficit could adjust to balance by
depreciating the value of its currency, which should boost its exports and
make imports more expensive.27 But in reality, chronic trade deficit
countries have generally not adjusted well through the mechanism of
flexible exchange rates.28
Among the chief reasons for the failure in exchange rate adjustment
has been the incentive for deficit countries to keep their currencies strong
(that is, overvalued) to attract scarce private foreign portfolio investment.
But as experience shows, the overvalued currency only exacerbates the
trade deficit while necessitating further inflows of foreign capital.29
Eventually, the house of cards collapses and foreign investors run to the
door, all in a panic to sell at once. The deficit country’s currency finally
falls with a violence that sharply erodes domestic savings, ushers in
inflation, and leads all too often to International Monetary Fund (IMF)
emergency assistance that is tied to an agenda of economic austerity.30
The World Bank’s own statistics show that orthodox economic
27. BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 24, at 832–33 (noting that, likewise, a country
with a trade and current account surplus would require an appreciation in its currency to
return to trade balance).
28. A number of commentators have recognized the virtues of a system of
semifixed exchange rates that would provide for flexibility within a narrow range and
orderly mechanisms for adjustment of such ranges. For instance, the 1994 Bretton
Woods Commission, chaired by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker,
criticized liberalized exchange rates and advocated a return to a regime of semifixed
exchange rates. BRETTON WOODS COMM’N, BRETTON WOODS: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
A-4 (1994); see also Paul Volcker, Toward Monetary Stability, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24,
1996, at A12.
29. For a description of this cycle of dependence on hot money inflows, see
Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal
Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1604 (1999).
30. In exchange for IMF and World Bank assistance, deficit countries are expected
to adopt and implement a range of deflationary monetary and fiscal policies and other
reforms, in the past known as a structural adjustment program, and often documented
through so-called letters of intent. The process is often referred to as one of “loan
conditionality” because the IMF loans are conditioned upon implementation of the
policy reforms. Typically, a deficit country must agree to a strict diet of “fiscal
discipline” that will entail severe cuts in government spending, increases in taxes, and
sometimes user fees for health care and education. Richard Gerster, The IMF and Basic
Needs Conditionality,” 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 497, 497–98 (1982); see also WARREN
NYAMUGASIRA & RICK ROWDEN, NEW STRATEGIES, OLD LOAN CONDITIONS 32 (2002)
(criticizing new IMF and World Bank poverty reduction strategies), available at http://ibp.
forumone.com/resources/library/title.flml?letter=N.
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policies have had little impact in improving people’s lives around the
world.31 Throughout the world, the widening gulf between the super-rich,
the middle and working classes, and the poor now poses a clear and
present danger to our national and global security interests.32
While law and socioeconomics recognizes that the Ricardian model is
actually premised on the immobility of capital,33 too many mainstream
texts for courses in international business law still completely fail to
discuss such limitations of the Ricardian model or the increasing
significance of cross-border investment flows, including “hot money”
portfolio capital flows.34 New international trade theory has improved
31. Of the 4.7 billion people who live in the 100 countries that are World Bank and
IMF clients, 2.8 billion live on less than $2 a day and 1.2 billion live on less than $1 a
day; as a result of such poverty, 33,000 children die every day and more than 100 million
children, most of them girls, are not in school. These statistics are from the World
Bank’s official web site. See The World Bank Group, What Is the World Bank, at
http://web.worldbank.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2003). The pain of sudden ruin and mass
unemployment has contributed to dramatic escalations in street crime, ethnic violence,
and political instability on a global scale. Timothy A. Canova, Global Finance and the
International Monetary Fund’s Neoliberal Agenda: The Threat to the Employment,
Ethnic Identity, and Cultural Pluralism of Latina/o Communities, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1547, 1559–66 (2000).
32. Richard C. Bell & Michael Renner, A Global Marshall Plan to Fight Terrorism,
COMMON DREAMS NEWS CENTER, at http://www.commondreams.org/views01/1006-06.htm
(Oct. 6, 2001) (noting that, in outlining his plan on June 5, 1947, General George C.
Marshall said that there could be “no political stability and no assured peace” without
economic security, and that U.S. policy should be “directed not against any country or
doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos”).
33. DALLAS, supra note 5, at ch. 11. Ricardo apparently believed that capital
immobility was a positive characteristic.
For Ricardo it is the force of community that keeps capital at home even in the
face of higher profits abroad. Furthermore he affirms that he would be sorry to
see these feelings of community weakened. Perhaps he already suspected that
they would be weakened by the individualistic postulates of classical economics
and its faith in the invisible hand’s ability to transform private vice into public
virtue.
Id.; see also Sara Dillon, Trade and the Environment: A Challenge to the GATT/WTO
Principle of “Ever-Freer Trade,” 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 351, 380–81 (1996)
(arguing that serious flaws in the Ricardian doctrine of comparative advantage should
compel policymakers to develop a more cogent justification for free trade policies).
34. An example of this market myopia is in RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (6th ed. 2003), a casebook which, incredibly,
makes no mention of the vast expansion in cross-border portfolio capital flows or any of
the policy debates about capital liberalization. But other texts have appreciated the
limitations of the Ricardian model. See, e.g., PAUL B. STEPHAN III ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND POLICY 223 (1993) (stating that the
Hume-Smith-Ricardo classical model “ignored the effect of capital flows”). After
reporting on the enormous increase in international capital movements since the end of
World War II, the authors conclude how easy it is “to see how capital flows affect
national accounts and, therefore, how incomplete the Hume-Smith-Ricardo analysis has
become.” Id. at 224; cf. Charles Schumer & Paul Craig Roberts, Second Thoughts on
Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at A23 (arguing that Ricardo assumed the
immobility of factors of production).
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upon the Ricardian model in its ability to take capital flows into
account,35 and some leading modern trade theorists have reluctantly
acknowledged the dangers posed by today’s volatile maze of capital
flows.36 Unfortunately, that has not stopped many in the legal academy
from retelling the fairy tale of Ricardian comparative advantage as an
immutable fact that always justifies free trade in goods and services, as
well as free capital flows.37
By the mid-1990s, there was about $315 billion in annual global
foreign direct investment, mostly investment in fixed plant and equipment
by multinational corporations, and over $1.2 trillion a day in foreign
exchange transactions, much of which goes for portfolio investment (for
example, the purchase of foreign stocks and bonds).38 But because portfolio
35. PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFEDL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
(1997). Bertil Ohlin is among those credited with relaxing the assumption that the
factors of production are immobile, a necessary step on the way to the new theory of
international trade as articulated by economists such as Paul Krugman, Avinash Dixit,
and Albert S. Kyle. AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 488 (Thomas Cate
ed., 1997); see also ROBIN HAHNEL, PANIC RULES: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 17–20 (1999) (providing a critique of the Hecksher-Ohlin
theory); Davis & Neacsu, supra note 22, at 755 (discussing the Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem, also known as the “factor endowment approach,” which explains that
“countries with abundant capital will engage in capital-intensive industries and labor-rich
countries will engage in labor-intensive activities”).
With regard to the interwar transfer problem, Ohlin argued that Germany should use
monetary and fiscal austerity to reduce its level of income and thereby create a trade
surplus out of which reparations could be paid. Id. This can be seen as the intellectual
precursor to the IMF’s structural adjustment model, by which developing countries pay
interest on their international debt obligations out of trade surpluses created in conditions
of economic austerity.
36. PAUL Krugman, An Open Letter to Prime Minister Mahathir (Sept. 1, 1998)
(arguing in favor of capital and exchange controls to promote “a recovery of the real
economy”), available at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/mahathir.html; Paul Krugman,
Curfews on Capital Flight: What Are the Options? (Oct. 12, 1998) (discussing “cooling-off”
periods for capital flight), available at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/curfews.html (last
visited Jan. 14, 2004); Paul Krugman, Saving Asia: It’s Time to Get Radical, FORTUNE,
Sept. 7, 1998, at 75, 79 (arguing for temporary currency controls as part of the solution
to the “Great Asian [Economic] Slump”).
37. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 34, at 2–11 (including a simplistic account of the
free trade myth thinly disguised with names such as Westia, Tropica, and Egalia as
covers for developed market economies, developing nations, and nonmarket economies);
FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., THE STORY OF FOREIGN TRADE AND EXCHANGE (1998)
(presenting a simplified comic book version of the free trade fairy tale).
38. DALLAS, supra note 5, at ch. 11. Professor Dallas also points out that the total
volume of international trade in goods was about $5 trillion a year by the mid-1990s,
about as much value as changes hands in the foreign exchange markets each week. Id.
FDI flows peaked in 2000 at over $1 trillion a year, still well below the levels of crossborder foreign exchange and portfolio capital flows. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
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investment is highly liquid, it can also be highly unstable. Economists
sometimes refer to portfolio investment as the “hot money problem” to
describe how quickly market sentiment can irrationally turn from
exuberance to fear, and how devastating it can be when investors all try
to liquidate their investments and sell at the same time.39
Unquestioning adherence to Ricardian theory by today’s neoclassical
orthodoxy often results in flawed and dangerous policies. It permits
policymakers to simplistically blame the victims—often the deficit
countries—while absolving surplus countries from any responsibility.
This adherence to outdated theories and assumptions has become an
ideological straightjacket, confining the policy and imagination of
monetary authorities around the world, particularly at the IMF, which
has become one of the bunkers of orthodox economic thinking in
monetary affairs.
However, socioeconomics provides compelling explanations for the
failings of today’s corporate globalization model. It borrows from
heterodox economics and the field of psychology to explain the mass
psychosis of a currency contagion that has ravaged so many countries
around the world in the past decade.40 Analysis of narrative discourse
and mass communications studies help explain how elite opinion and the
mass media keeps the dominant model entrenched through both elite and
popular discourse.41 Political science offers such constructs as captured
agencies, iron triangles, and revolving doors to explain the mechanisms
by which private power has corrupted the mission of public regulators to
provide transparent market rules and stable capital markets.42
DEVELOPMENT, ESTIMATED FDI FLOWS IN 2001 AND THE IMPACT OF THE EVENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES, NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT (2001) (estimating a forty percent decline in
FDI flows, from $1.2 trillion to $760 million, in 2001 as a result of the September 11th
aftermath), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poitem49.en.pdf.
39. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 65–66 (2002)
(referring to “hot money” as “short-term loans and contracts that are usually no more
than bets on exchange rate movements”); Sandra Polaski, Understanding the Peso
Crisis—Was It Related to NAFTA?, in JOHN J. AUDLEY ET AL., NAFTA’s PROMISE AND
REALITY: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE 11, 18–19 (2003) (referring to
portfolio capital as “mobile” or “footloose” investment in government bonds and
corporate stocks and bonds).
40. Psychology helps to deconstruct the orthodox economic assumptions of
autonomy, rationality, and efficiency and provide more realistic explanations for economic
behavior. See generally DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN
ECONOMICS (1994).
41. Canova, supra note 29, at 1586–95 (discussing how dominant neoliberal
discourses are used to justify NAFTA’s financial liberalization provisions).
42. The political science critique also borrows from legal realists, institutionalists,
and the public choice theorists. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
PURPOSE 142–44 (1973); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 60–61, 82–84 (2d
ed. 1979) (characterizing the agency capture problem as inherent in a system of interest
group pluralism); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
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Socioeconomics also employ legal doctrines, such as unconscionability
doctrine from contract law, to impeach the sanctity of international trade
agreements between formally rational and autonomous nation states by
pointing to the great disparities in bargaining power that actually exist
between such parties.43 Socioeconomics easily draws on history to
explain the inevitable folly of fully liberalized capital markets.44 And
nothing short of anthropological inquiry can possibly explain the
mystique, secrecy, cultural traditions, and learned patterns of thought
and behavior that have both empowered and constrained the flailing
leaders of the financial orthodoxy.45
Socioeconomics also looks to history and heterodox economics to
suggest alternative directions for reform, including a revitalized regulatory
model consisting of controls on hot money capital flows.46 While some
neoclassical advocates argue reflexively against capital controls, even
HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1986) (arguing that courts came to regard regulation “as
economically inefficient and as the product not of broad political consensus but of the
capture of lawmaking bodies by producer groups seeking benefit at the expense of
others”). The power of entrenched interests became apparent when Joseph Stiglitz was
forced to resign as chief economist of the World Bank for his repeated criticism of IMF
policy. Stiglitz was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics only a year later. Canova,
supra note 31, at 1573–74; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 39, at x–xvi (describing his
frustration with IMF policies that were formulated on the basis of ideology “that seemed
to be thinly veiling special interests”).
43. Davis & Neacsu, supra note 22, at 747 (arguing that uncontested assumptions
of the law of comparative advantage foreclose debate on questions dealing with the
autonomy, competence, and relative bargaining power of Third World countries, and
therefore on the enforceability of international agreements).
44. JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCE AT RISK 31–34 (2000)
(recounting nineteenth and twentieth century history of destabilizing capital flows);
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929–1939, at 146–70
(recounting the 1931 currency contagion, cross-border transmission of financial crisis
throughout Europe and to the United States).
45. For instance, investigative journalistic accounts have deepened our understanding
of the Federal Reserve and foreign central banks more than any mainstream economic
analyses. See generally WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 48–55 (1987)
(analyzing U.S. monetary history and the Federal Reserve System); DAVID MARSH, THE
MOST POWERFUL BANK 45–48 (1992) (providing an analysis of the German
Bundesbank); STEVEN SOLOMON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME 26–37, 63–79, 110–22 (1995)
(providing an analysis of central banking and globalization of finance).
46. Article VI of the IMF Articles of Agreement permits member nations to
implement controls on capital flows. Such controls could take the form of regulatory or
reserve requirements on inflows or outflows, or a turnover tax on foreign exchange
transactions (the so-called Tobin tax). Canova, supra note 29, at 1610, 1622–33
(including discussion of the Tobin tax proposal by the late James Tobin, another Nobel
laureate, to tax foreign exchange transactions “to throw sand in the gears of the
speculators” while raising hundreds of billions of dollars to fund a global Marshall Plan).
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asserting quite laughably that there has never been a single example of
effective capital controls,47 the historical record is quite clear that such
restrictions were extremely effective in shielding Western Europe from
speculative damage during post-war reconstruction.48 In more recent years,
Chile weathered the “tequila effect” of the currency contagion by the use
of prudential restrictions on capital flows,49 and even the IMF felt forced
to concede that Malaysia’s use of capital controls (and more intrusive
exchange controls on current transactions) were effective as well.50
47. Letter from Michael Gordon to Michael Norwood (Jan. 22, 2003) (on file with
author). Gordon’s invective against critics of free trade policies is not merely “trivial
name calling” but an example of how dominant ideologies (and their proponents) attempt
to devalue their opponents and exclude them from public discourse. Davis & Neacsu,
supra note 22, at 734–35 (arguing that “one of the hegemonic and legitimating features
of globalization is the exclusion of parts of the debate as unworthy, in fact foreclosing
what might be the most meaningful parts of the debate as meaningless”).
48. For most Western European countries, capital controls remained in place
throughout most of the 1950s, and for some countries, until the early 1990s. FRED L.
BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER 109–37 (1977) (providing
a history of post-war Western European currency controls; throughout the Marshall Plan
period no major European currency was convertible); MARGARET GARRITSEN DE VRIES,
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT, 1945 TO 1986: THE IMF EXPERIENCE 30–32
(1987); Duncan E. Williams, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in
Emerging Market Nations: Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look at the
International Legal Regime, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 562–63 (2001).
49. Canova, supra note 31, at 1621. Likewise, throughout 2003, Thailand imposed
capital controls to keep its financial markets from overheating while its economy was
surging. Wayne Arnold, Thailand Sets Path to a Better Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2003, at W1 (reporting Thai capital controls that restrict nonresidents from holding more
than 300 million baht ($7.5 million) and require them to keep their funds in a Thai bank
for at least six months); Shawn W. Crispin, Thai Boom Is Raising Concerns, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 28, 2003, at A6 (reporting a “mild form of capital controls barring financial
concerns in Thailand from borrowing baht from foreigners except to finance a specific
business transaction”).
50. Michael M. Phillips, IMF Concedes that Malaysia’s Controls over Capital
Produced Positive Results, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1999, at A21. One noteworthy critic of
capital restrictions, Michael Gordon, was completely oblivious to the IMF’s conclusion
about the success of Malaysia’s program of capital controls, as well as the record of
capital controls in Chile in the 1990s, throughout Western Europe from the 1950s to the
1990s, and throughout East Asia today, or even the very public debates within both the
IMF and World Bank about the pace and sequencing of capital account liberalization.
Letter from Michael Gordon, supra note 47. Gordon, no doubt, would have also missed
the news that China’s capital controls were proving so successful at keeping its currency
undervalued and its trade surplus with the United States so large that the Bush administration
made it into a major diplomatic issue. Joseph Kahn, China Resisting Pressure from U.S.
Treasury Chief to Ease Its Currency Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2003, at A8 (reporting
that U.S. Treasury Secretary, under heavy political pressure at home, was calling on
Chinese officials to relax their “capital controls that restrict the amount of foreign
currency Chinese companies and individuals can take out of the country”); cf. Jagdish
Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars,
FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1998, at 7, 10 (pointing out that China and Japan have
registered remarkable growth rates, and Western Europe returned to prosperity, without
capital account convertibility).
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A more honest and intelligent approach to capital account liberalization
would view the issue in terms of pace and sequencing, particularly because
many developing countries may not be prepared for full liberalization
of hot-money portfolio capital flows until they have developed their
institutional and legal infrastructures.51 In this way, the discussions about
capital account liberalization can be tied to other “rule of law” reforms
in developing countries that focus on creating stable political and legal
institutions.52
Unfortunately, academic and public debates about globalization often
degenerate into all-or-nothing dead ends that offer little more than false
dichotomies.53 For instance, many commentators are either completely
for free trade, NAFTA, the WTO, the IMF, and unfettered mobility of
any and all kinds of capital, or completely against them, with few
articulating reform positions. Likewise with discussions about rule of
law reforms. It is tempting to dismiss rule of law reforms that obscure
the need for other, external reforms,54 or that seek to impose foreign
values or limit the capabilities of developing countries to choose their
own models of development.55 But at its best, rule of law reforms
51. R. Barry Johnston, Sequencing Capital Account Liberalization, FIN. & DEV.,
Dec. 1998, at 20 (arguing that an appropriate regulatory framework should precede
financial sector liberalization). Stiglitz was particularly critical of the IMF’s failures in
the sequencing and pacing of its liberalization program imposed prematurely on
countries with weak institutions. STIGLITZ, supra note 39, at 73–74.
In early 2003, the IMF’s chief economist, Kenneth Rogoff, coauthored a “sobering”
report concluding that there was no clear proof that financial globalization helps poor
countries and finding that financial integration may increase the risk of financial crisis in
the developing world. The report was not able to come up with a “clear roadmap” for how
countries can open themselves up to foreign investment, including highly liquid
investments in portfolio capital. ESWAR PRASAD ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, EFFECTS
OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 5–
7, 58 (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/docs/2003/031703.pdf.
52. Andre Newburg, The Changing Roles of the Bretton Woods Institutions:
Evolving Concepts of Conditionality, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY LAW: ISSUES FOR
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 81, 87 (Mario Giovanoli ed., 2000) (describing the new conditionality
in the 1990s as focusing on governance concerns and stable political and legal institutions).
53. Timothy A. Canova, The Disorders of Unrestricted Capital Mobility and the
Limits of the Orthodox Imagination, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 219, 224 (2000) (book
review) (describing the false dichotomies of globalization debates).
54. See Canova, supra note 29, at 1593–94 (arguing that legal reform narratives
obscure the destructive nature of the IMF’s structural adjustment policies).
55. For instance, the IMF has promoted central bank autonomy as part of its new
conditionality of good governance legal reforms. For instance, see KEMAL DERVIS &
SUREVYYA SERDENGECTI, MEMORANDUM ON ECONOMIC POLICIES (2001) (stating Turkey’s
commitment to amend its central bank law “to give full operational independence to the
central bank in pursuing its primary mandate of maintaining price stability”), available
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provide baseline rules for private markets to flourish, and therefore
would complement necessary external reforms (such as relaxing the
IMF’s austerity conditions and increasing levels of foreign aid).56
Socioeconomics supports a broad, reformist perspective that includes
public investment in physical infrastructure (such as transportation and
communication systems), social infrastructure (such as education and
training), and legal infrastructure.57 Developing legal infrastructure—the
very ground rules for private markets—is quintessentially socioeconomic in
approach and facilitates economic development by protecting private
contracts and property rights.58
Legal reform efforts have also evolved from crude proposals that
would simply impose U.S. legal codes on developing countries to
multilateral projects that reflect the variety of local conditions, such as
the Organization of American State’s (OAS) Model Law of Secure
Transactions recently unveiled by the World Bank.59 Such reform
efforts would help countries develop their private capital markets and
grow their economies, thereby increasing the tax base and supporting
at http://www.imf.org/external/NP/LOI/2001/tur/02/INDEX.HTM (May 3, 2001). But the
agenda of central bank autonomy is highly contestable. See Timothy A. Canova, Financial
Liberalization, International Monetary Dis/Order, and the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 1279, 1294–1302 (2000) (arguing that central bank autonomy is based on
flawed history and limited economic assumptions).
56. This Author wishes to acknowledge his own previous errors in prematurely
rejecting efforts to create the legal infrastructure necessary to develop private enterprise
and capital markets. Cf. Canova, supra note 29, at 1591. My rethinking of these issues
has been heavily influenced by the works of the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto,
numerous discussions and friendly debates with Frank Gill, Ted Parnall, Alan Swan, and
Keith Rosen, and the good faith and exemplary good works of Boris Kosolchyk and his
National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade. The Author is also indebted to
David Gantz, Sandy Gaines, and Raj Bhala for demonstrating that support for freer trade
can be consistent with responsible global citizenship.
57. Many developing countries have difficulty investing sufficiently in their own
infrastructure, often because of the fiscal austerity imposed as conditions for IMF
financial assistance. Reform of the adjustment model is therefore necessary to permit
countries to invest in developing their own resources.
58. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 49–51 (2000) [hereinafter DE
SOTO, THE MYSTERY] (arguing that legal protections for private property and contract are
two often overlooked prerequisites for capital and market economy development);
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM 177–82,
250–51 (1989) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH]; WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS
IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION ix–x (2004) (advocating regulatory reforms and
comparing 130 countries on the basis of quantitative indicators of business regulations of
property relations, contract rights, starting and closing a business, and credit and labor
markets).
59. Boris Kozolchyk & Dale Beck Furnish, The OAS Model Law on Secured
Transactions: A Comparative Analysis, GLOBAL FORUM ON INSOLVENCY RISK
MANAGEMENT (World Bank, forthcoming 2004) (analyzing the importance of modern
secured transactions law, contrasting Article 9 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code
with the Mexican Reform Laws of May 2000 and June 2003, and the Model InterAmerican Law on Secured Transactions of the Organization of American States).
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public investment in infrastructure.60
Of course, many countries may need help in achieving and maintaining
adequate levels of public investment. Foreign aid, including the recycling
of surpluses through public sector capital transfers, is another policy that
finds support in the socioeconomic approach. Such foreign assistance has
strong precedent in the Marshall Plan,61 a compelling historical success
that is raised time and again as a model for achieving important
economic and strategic objectives around the world.62
Socioeconomics does not seek to outlaw or banish private market
mechanisms, but merely to provide rules and sensible limits on market
activity.63 Such a regulated global investment environment would
benefit not just poor and developing countries, but also wealthy creditor
and donor nations that have been hit hard by slow growth, global
overcapacity, private sector investment panics, and corporate
scandals.
60. DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY, supra note 58, 58–61; DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH,
supra note 58, at 250–51.
61. Under the Marshall Plan, from 1947 to 1951 the United States gave (as grants,
not loans) nearly $13 billion to West European countries, including its former enemies.
The $13 billion given away by the United States in Marshall Plan aid was estimated to be
about $88 billion in today’s terms. Curt Tarnoff, The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments,
and Relevance to the Present, in THE MARSHALL PLAN FROM THOSE WHO MADE IT
SUCCEED 349, 349–50, 379 (Constantine C. Menges ed., 1999). Others have estimated
that the size of the Marshall Plan would be much higher, more than $100 billion, in
today’s dollars. Paul Davidson, Reforming the World’s Money, 15 J. POST KEYNESIAN
ECON. 153, 156 (1992–93). The impact of the Marshall Plan was immediate, as
economic growth increased by nearly forty percent in countries receiving the aid.
Canova, supra note 29, at 1638–39.
62. Kofi A. Annan, Trade and Aid in a Changed World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2002, at A23 (calling for increased foreign assistance to address the crisis of global
poverty); David W. Jones & Christine Dolan, Kenyan President Envisions a “Marshall
Plan” for Africa, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at C1 (calling for a Marshall Plan for
Africa); Robert Malley, Rebuilding a Damaged Palestine, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at
A31 (calling for foreign assistance as the cornerstone of a Mideast peace); M. Ishaq
Nadiri, Rebuilding a Ravaged Land, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at A17 (calling for
foreign assistance for Afghanistan’s reconstruction); Richard Sokolsky & Joseph
McMillan, Foreign Aid in Our Own Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2002, at A23 (calling
for a new Marshall Plan “to make terrorism wither”).
63. Public sector investment and foreign assistance should also be directed to
creating and improving the legal infrastructure of developing countries, including
making the rule of law and legal protections for private property and contract more
widely accessible. DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY, supra note 58, at 49–51 (arguing that legal
protections for private property and contract are two often overlooked prerequisites for
capital and market economy development); DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 58, at
177–82, 250–51.
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The socioeconomic approach also permits a realistic critique of other
aspects of today’s unregulated, corporate globalization. For instance, the
liberalization of investment rules in host countries, along with lower
labor and environmental protections standards, has provided powerful
incentives for multinationals to engage in foreign production through
foreign direct investment. But without a brake, such as minimum
enforceable international labor and environmental standards, foreign
direct investment could become a classic race to the bottom64 whereby
large multinational corporations seek the lowest labor and regulatory
costs, thereby undermining the previous comparative advantages of
countries with higher wage rates and better environmental protection.65
The loss of many thousands of Mexican maquiladora jobs to Southeast
Asia in only the past three years demonstrates that it is a big world,
and there is always someplace lower in the race to the bottom.66
Socioeconomics points the way to reforming multilateral institutions,
including the WTO, to harmonize labor and environmental standards on
a regional or even global basis.67
64. John Coffee suggests that “[t]he term ‘regulatory arbitrage’ is a more neutral
term for what others call the ‘race to the bottom,’ that is, the migration of legal entities to
the more lenient regulatory regime, with consequent pressure for regulatory relaxation on
all regulators.” John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 650
n.31 (1999).
65. In a recent report on NAFTA sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation for
International Peace, the authors conclude that the fear of a race to the bottom in
environmental regulation “has proved unfounded.” John J. Audley, Introduction to
NAFTA’S PROMISE AND REALITY: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE, supra
note 39, at 5, 7. Still, the report finds that environmental regulations were weakened in
all three NAFTA countries, real spending on Mexico’s pollution monitoring and on-site
inspections fell by forty-five percent since enactment of NAFTA, and NAFTA has
contributed to an increase in annual gross emissions of carbon monoxide and sulfur
dioxide, as well as air pollution spikes in the Canadian-U.S. and U.S.-Mexican border
regions. Scott Vaughan, The Greenest Trade Agreement Ever?: Measuring the Environmental
Impacts of Agricultural Liberalization, in NAFTA’S PROMISE AND REALITY: LESSONS
FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE, supra note 39, at 61, 66–67. The report also finds
that NAFTA has coincided with weak labor laws and falling real wages for most
Mexicans and greater income inequality in both Mexico and the United States. The
report further attributes to NAFTA a portion of the observed growth in U.S. wage
inequality. Id. at 12–13, 24–35.
66. Juan Forero, As China Gallops, Mexico Sees Factory Jobs Slip Away, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2003, at A3 (reporting that according to the Mexican government, 500 of
Mexico’s 3700 maquiladora factories have shut down since 2001, at a cost of 218,000
jobs); Elisabeth Malkin, Manufacturing Jobs Are Exiting Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2002, at W1 (reporting that Mexico’s maquiladora industry lost 287,000 jobs between
October 2000 and March 2002, a twenty-one percent decline, and that thousands of those
jobs moved to China, Thailand, and Vietnam).
67. See Canova, supra note 55, at 1318 (calling for a “grand bargain” whereby
developing countries would accept enforceable labor and environmental standards
through the WTO, and in return, wealthy countries would accept their share of
“adjustment burdens” by significantly increasing foreign aid and public capital flows to
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The law and economics approach raised the visibility of the business
law curriculum in legal education. But its narrow focus on efficiency
and aggregate growth failed to explain the weaknesses of the orthodox
free market model. In contrast, law and socioeconomics should enrich
legal education by offering more compelling descriptions of market realities
while also providing the opening for richer and wider discussions about
alternative reform possibilities.
IV. APPLIED INTERNATIONAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONCEPTS
Although we are familiar with some use of international materials in
our domestic courses, these materials tend to be limited in amount and
more comparative than purely international in nature. As noted above,
discussions of labor law and capital transfers can be used to compare
European Union and North American approaches. Often, however,
international and comparative materials are kept carefully segregated in
“appropriate” courses. Our corporations courses consider homegrown
incorporated business entities and focus on state corporate laws and
federal securities laws and regulations. A study of non-U.S. business
forms and the regulation to which they are subject awaits a course such
as international business transactions. Indeed, under this segregation
paradigm, even a discussion of transborder migrations is relegated to a
course explicitly on “international” law or, yet more narrowly, to a
course on immigration law.
The previous discussions underscore how porous are national borders,
and thus how artificial is also the domestic- versus foreign-course
boundary. As the description of labor law and financing in the global
markets proves, this segregation has become unrealistic, and even the
diffidently comparative approach is insufficient. The related point is that as
help finance the higher regulatory standards). Monetary integration in Western Europe
was preceded by significant transfers of capital in the form of the European Union (EU)
regional aid program by which some $227 billion will subsidize the EU’s poorer regions
over the present five-year period, a veritable ongoing Marshall Plan within the EU.
Drowning in a Sea of Structural Funds?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2003, at 50; see also The
EU’s Regional Aid: What’s Ours Is Ours, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2001, at 47 (reporting
that the regional assistance program makes up around thirty-five percent of the EU
budget). It is telling that neither NAFTA nor the proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas proposal include any similar plans for regional aid transfers to assist poorer
countries and regions to meet minimum regulatory and living standards. Timothy A.
Canova, Free-Market Policies Must Help Latin America, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 17, 2003,
at 23A.
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our discussions in class become more complex, the socioeconomic
perspective becomes still more appropriate. How can we discuss NorthSouth labor migrations without considering the cultural and social
realities, as well as economic realities, in both parts of the world? How
can we even begin to discuss the appropriateness of minimum labor
standards—without yet considering what they should be—before
completing a careful comparison not only of the various jurisdictions’
formal labor laws, but also of those laws’ outcomes in context?
Similarly, we cannot meaningfully analyze the desirability of a social
clause in the WTO Agreement unless we include social and cultural as
well as economic consequences. Any discussion of whether labor rights
should be linked to intellectual property rights should consider the effect
of applicable laws in their actual context. In the same way, a review of
the effects of foreign direct investment and portfolio capital investment
requires an appreciation of all aspects of encouraging or discouraging
capital flows.
Including the international in traditionally domestic courses recognizes
the reality of globalization. The socioeconomic perspective allows us to
teach this complex reality in the richest, most complete way possible. It
is about teaching law in context.
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